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Abstract: This paper analyses ASEAN’s prominence in regional order negotiation and management in Southeast Asia 
and the Asia-pacific through the lens of social role negotiation. It argues that ASEAN has negotiated legitimate social 
roles as the ‘primary manager’ in Southeast Asia and the ‘regional conductor’ of the Asia-Pacific order. It develops an 
English School-inspired role negotiation framework and applies it to three periods: 1954-1975 when ASEAN’s ‘primary 
manager’ role emerged from negotiations with the US; 1978-1991 when ASEAN’s role was strengthened through 
negotiations with China during the Cambodian conflict; and 1991-present when ASEAN created and expanded the 
‘regional conductor’ role. Negotiations during the Cold War established a division of labour where great powers 
provided security public goods but the great power function of diplomatic leadership was transferred to ASEAN. 
ASEAN's diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia provided a foundation for creating its 'regional conductor' role after 
the Cold War. ASEAN’s ability to sustain its roles depends on maintaining role bargains acceptable to the great powers, 
an increasingly difficult task due to great power rivalry in the South China Sea.  
 
Keywords: ASEAN; regional order; social roles; great powers; English School 
 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has played a prominent part in negotiating 
and managing order in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific, during times of stability and during 
times of transition and crisis when we would expect the great powers exclusively to play the leading 
role. What is interesting about ASEAN’s contribution to order is that, rather than being a by-product 
of either the regional balance of power or the region’s unique normative structure, it instead appears 
to constitute part of a division of labour negotiated with the great powers. After the US’ failure in 
Vietnam led it to withdraw from mainland Southeast Asia in 1975 a situation emerged where the US 
provided security public goods and guarantees to maritime Southeast Asia through bilateral security 
relationships whilst ASEAN developed indigenous forms of association which it sought to extend to 
Vietnam. The US’ and ASEAN’s performance of these functions were complementary in that they 
were both aimed towards embedding an anti-communist order in maritime Southeast Asia and 
neutralising the perceived threat from Vietnam. The ASEAN states’ regionalism enabled its 
members to demonstrate regional autonomy and the US’ distance from direct military involvement 
  
in Southeast Asia satisfied a domestic population critical of its costly intervention in Vietnam. 
Although not necessarily intentional, this reflected a clear division of labour. During Vietnam's 
occupation of Cambodia, this division of labour was reinforced and shifted to include China. 
ASEAN provided a diplomatic vanguard to delegitimise Vietnam’s actions, whilst China threatened 
Vietnam and tied it down within Cambodia by aiding Cambodian rebels. The US acquiesced to 
China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979 and continued to provide support to the coalition from a 
distance (Emmers 2003, Jones 2012). In the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific ASEAN has developed 
regional institutions that encompass all the major regional powers, including the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and East Asia Summit (EAS). All the great powers have 
signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), recognising ASEAN’s norms in return for 
joining the EAS. ASEAN’s diplomatic leadership in providing forums for inclusive engagement and 
a normative framework all can agree on complements the US’ continued provision of security 
public goods through its hub-and-spokes alliance network and China’s increasing provision of 
economic public goods. 
 
Such small power contribution to order has attracted vigorous debate (Emmers 2003, Eaton 
and Stubbs 2006, Ba 2009, Jones 2012, Acharya 2014, Stubbs 2014). This paper’s primary 
contribution is to bring the analysis of social roles into this debate. By analysing social role 
negotiation between ASEAN and the great powers, we can build on previous work to better 
understand how ASEAN’s contribution fits into the regional division of labour. In particular this 
paper argues that ASEAN has come to perform important social roles as the ‘primary manager’ of 
Southeast Asian order and ‘regional conductor’i of Asia-Pacific order as a result of reaching 
reciprocal role bargains with the great powers. These role bargains have established a division of 
labour with respect to the performance of functions in upholding regional order. The paper will 
show how these role bargains have been reached at key junctures from the early Cold War to the 
present day. During the Cold War, ASEAN’s role bargains with the US and China established a 
division of labour where great powers provided security public goods but the key great power 
function of diplomatic leadership was transferred to ASEAN. ASEAN's diplomatic leadership in 
Southeast Asia then provided a foundation for creating its 'regional conductor' role in the 
uncertainty after the Cold War and embedding it within renewed role bargains vis-a-vis the US’ 
'offshore great power guarantor' role and China’s 'responsible regional great power' role. ASEAN's 
ability to sustain its prominence in order negotiation and management is due to its redefining, 
  
reclaiming and renegotiating its evolving roles within bargains with the great powers. 
 
This paper advances its arguments through three sections. The first discusses the debate 
regarding ASEAN’s contribution to regional order and explores how alternative approaches have 
understood ASEAN’s role. It argues that each approach captures important aspects of ASEAN’s role 
but that a social roles analysis, rooted in an English School (ES) conceptual framework, better 
provides the flexibility necessary to account for cumulative and ongoing ASEAN-great power 
negotiations. The second section outlines an analytical framework for tracing social role negotiation 
based on legitimation whereby an actor claims a role and seeks endorsement from key legitimating 
constituencies. The third section then applies this framework to three periods: 1954-1975, when 
ASEAN's 'primary manager' role was created through a bargain with the US vis-a-vis the US' 
'offshore great power guarantor' role in maritime Southeast Asia; 1979-1991, during the Cambodian 
conflict when ASEAN began to extend its 'primary manager' role to mainland Southeast Asia 
through a role bargain with China which legitimised China’s ‘regional great power guarantor’ role; 
1991-present, when ASEAN built on cumulative role negotiation to create its 'regional conductor' 
role in the wider Asia-Pacific region. This paper concludes by highlighting the current challenges 
for ASEAN in maintaining role bargains with the great powers under increasing great power rivalry. 
 
Debating ASEAN’s role  
 
For a long time ASEAN’s role was understood through an implicitly realist lens. Leifer captured 
well the nature of ASEAN’s role as a moderately successful regional manager within its own 
subregion and a diplomatic community that could act collectively beyond its subregion (Leifer 
1989). However, realists considered ASEAN’s role contingent on the balance of power between the 
great powers. Any regional division of labour would therefore reflect how power was balanced 
within the region and whether the great powers had an interest in granting ASEAN a role, or 
whether their disinterest essentially left ASEAN to its own devises. It was the latter that led to 
ASEAN taking up its regional management role as Britain and the US drew-down their military 
commitments leaving ASEAN states to take responsibility for managing their own relations and 
prevent a vacuum being filled by other external powers. The communist victories in Indochina 
boosted ASEAN’s internal managerial role but its external diplomatic role was only boosted after 
Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia drew the interests of China and the US back into Southeast 
  
Asia making ASEAN a partner in balancing against Vietnam. ASEAN then found space to extend 
its regional management into the Asia-Pacific by forming the ARF because of the strategic 
uncertainty immediately after the Cold War and because no great power individually or collectively 
was willing or able to provide leadership in creating a regional security organisation. As long as 
great power rivalry continued then the great powers had an interest in passing the buck of regional 
institution-building to ASEAN and ASEAN’s promotion of consultation and conflict avoidance 
could enjoy limited success (Leifer 1996, Emmers 2003). 
 
Constructivists challenged this approach, arguing that ASEAN could actively shape great 
power interests in maintaining its prominence by acting as a norm entrepreneur and socialiser 
(Johnston 2008, Acharya 2009, 2014). ASEAN was continuing a tradition of Asian actors localising 
external norms and creating indigenous norms. These formed a normative structure which 
determined what was appropriate for different types of powers to do in the region and thereby 
accounted for the region’s division of labour. ASEAN’s success in establishing the ARF reflected 
the embeddedness of sovereignty and anti-colonialism in the normative structure; non-hierarchical 
cooperative security led by small powers was more appropriate than great power-led collective 
security (Acharya 2009). ASEAN’s informal forums offered conducive environments for socialising 
wary great powers into accepting and internalising these norms. China’s increasing comfort with 
multilateralism and moves towards a benign good neighbour policy in the early 2000s were seen as 
reflecting such internalisation (Johnston 2008). However, China’s recent assertive turn has 
challenged this argument and there remains the outstanding question of why bilateral great power-
small power security ties, where domination is more acute, were considered appropriate within the 
division of labour. This suggests the need to look beyond the intersection between structure and 
state interaction in understanding how state interests and norms can be differently interpreted and 
instrumentalised in realising the regional division of labour. 
 
Critical theorists have done so by highlighting the importance of domestic social forces 
(Jones 2012). Jones has convincingly shown that ASEAN’s preference for regional cooperation 
based on non-interference is not due to the salience of norms but rooted in the politics of ruling 
classes within ASEAN states and their concern to insulate social conflicts from external 
interference. He has argued that this makes ASEAN’s regional management defensive in nature 
aiming to keep unwanted issues off the regional agenda rather than offering any substantive 
  
normative leadership (Jones 2010, 2012). However, ASEAN’s place in the regional division of 
labour depends on ASEAN satisfying great power demands. This has meant issues such as human 
rights and democracy promotion, particularly pertaining to Myanmar, have had to be included on 
ASEAN’s regional agenda (Jones 2012: 180-210). 
 
Some important insights emerge from the exchanges between realist, constructivist and 
critical approaches which can be fruitfully brought together. These are that the balance of power 
alongside prevailing norms are critically important in providing a political context within which 
actors interact. However, these contexts are not determinate but are themselves shaped by 
interaction, contestation and negotiation between states and important social forces. Bringing these 
insights together is where a role negotiation framework comes in. The negotiation of roles between 
states takes place within prevailing distributions of capabilities and normative/political contexts but 
is shaped by competing social forces who seek to achieve certain interests through conceptualising 
particular roles for their state and having others states perform complementary roles (Cantir and 
Kaarbo 2016). 
 
The role negotiation framework that this paper develops draws influence from recent 
constructivist writings on role theory, particularly in understanding the concepts of role conceptions, 
role expectations and role enactment (Harnisch et al 2011). However, it departs from their efforts to 
develop generalisable theoretical models for analysing role processes (role making, role-taking, role 
bargaining etc) between agents interacting within social structures. This paper instead positions its 
analysis of roles within an English School conceptual framework, asserting that social roles 
constitute a key aspect of a broader social and purposive arrangement that the ES identifies within 
the concept of international order (Bull 1995, Hurrell 2007). The ES seeks to understand how 
particular international and regional orders are constituted through the negotiation and mutual 
understandings of the members of international or regional society. A central feature of such 
negotiation is legitimacy, analysed by scholars working within the ES specifically in relation to how 
great and small powers reach bargains over respective responsibilities towards building and 
managing order (Goh 2011, Clark 2011, Bukovansky et al 2012). This paper contributes to this 
work by developing a simple framework based on the practice of legitimation which helps capture 
roles negotiation between actors interacting within their specific social and historical contexts. 
 
  
 In relation to ASEAN this paper also builds on Alice Ba’s work on cumulative negotiation 
(Ba 2009) and complements Stubbs’ understanding of ASEAN’s leadership as part of a regional 
division of labour (Stubbs 2014). Ba shows how ASEAN actors successfully renegotiate ideas about 
regional organisation at critical junctures, allowing ASEAN to remain central to the various 
institutional expressions of ‘region’ (Ba 2009). She also addresses the question of ASEAN's 
legitimacy, focusing on ASEAN's responses to external challenges through a mixture of resistance 
and reform (Ba 2013). Ba’s work, however, is mostly concerned with internal ASEAN negotiations 
in maintaining its relevance and legitimacy in the face of challenges. She does not explicitly look at 
the bargains ASEAN may have reached with the great powers over the wider issue of ASEAN’s 
contribution to regional order. Ba’s work on intra-ASEAN consensus over great power roles is 
however highly relevant in understanding these bargains. Stubbs (2014) has addressed this to a 
certain extent by arguing that ASEAN's leadership is limited to providing initiatives for consultation 
and cooperation whilst other powers provide security or economic leadership. Stubbs (2014) argues 
that ASEAN has shown significant entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership in carving out its 
place in the division of labour which complements its status as a non-threatening and neutral player. 
This is down to ASEAN’s ‘competence power’ (Eaton and Stubbs 2006). This paper goes further by 
showing how this division of labour has been negotiated by ASEAN and the great powers as part of 
their respective social roles over a number of decades. This division of labour includes: the US 
providing security public goods as the 'offshore great power guarantor'; China providing regional 
economic public goods and strategic restraint as the 'responsible regional great power'; Japan 
providing regional economic and financial public goods through its 'regional economic great power' 
role; and ASEAN providing diplomatic leadership as the 'regional conductor'. Before showing how 
this played out the next section outlines the role negotiation analytical framework. 
 
Role negotiation in international society 
This section has two aims: 1) define the concept of order and situate social roles and the notion of a 
role bargain within this concept of order; 2) outline the process of role negotiation and show how it 
can be operationalised through analysing the practice of legitimation. 
 
 Order is “a formal or informal arrangement that sustains rule-governed interaction among … 
[groups or individuals] ... in their pursuit of individual and collective goals” (Alagappa 2003: 39). 
The relevant goals will depend on context but we can understand rules as taking three inter-related 
  
forms: explicit legal rules set out in treaties; implicit norms that determine appropriate and 
inappropriate behaviour; and fundamental 'deep rules', known as primary institutions (Buzan 2004, 
Khong 2014). Primary institutions are “durable and recognised patterns of shared practices rooted in 
values held commonly by the members of ... societies, and embodying a mix of norms, rules and 
principles” (Buzan 2004: 181). Primary institutions constitute international society; they reflect the 
'rules of the game' which provide a normative foundation for order that constitutes who the 
members are and regulates their behaviour. The two primary institutions most concerned with how 
order is negotiated and managed are great power management and diplomacy. It is within these 
institutions that we can find ES discussion of social roles. 
 
Social roles are made up of three elements: identity, status and function. Actors come to 
perform social roles through reaching role bargains. A role bargain is a key aspect of a broader 
understanding on what order is (its material and normative bases), what goals are to be achieved 
within the order and how order should be managed (what order functions need to be performed and 
by whom). Actors need to reach a working agreement on their respective legitimate identities, their 
places within the society (status) and what functions are legitimate for each to perform in relation to 
negotiating and managing order. A role bargain can therefore be defined as a reciprocal arrangement 
whereby actors, implicitly or explicitly, agree to a division of labour with respect to the 
performance of order functions, which accords with their respective identities and statuses and 
satisfies their interests within the prevailing social and political context. We can identify an implicit 
role bargain within the institution of great power management, which sets out not only the great 
power role but also a corresponding small power role (Bull 1995: 194-222, Buzan 2004: 161-204). 
Small powers recognise the special status and rights of great powers, but great powers need to 
exercise their responsibilities towards order and recognise small power identities, their status as 
sovereign states and also the functions they may perform in upholding order. 
 
The great power role has received ample attention for obvious reasons within great power 
management, but the functions small powers perform has generally been neglected and instead 
considered as falling within the primary institution of diplomacy (Khong 2014). However, if great 
and small powers' respective responsibilities are negotiated as part of a reciprocal bargain, then it 
makes sense to consider these under a single institution. This paper merges great power 
management and diplomacy into a broader primary institution of 'order management', which does 
  
not presuppose that great powers exclusively have responsibility for negotiating and managing 
order. This allows us to look at how actors may negotiate variegated responsibilities towards order 
(Bukovansky et al 2012). Order management is conceptually made up of context-specific 'order 
functions'. Different functions will be relevant depending on the order under study and will be 
performed by different actors according to the particular negotiations that have taken place. Table 1 
outlines broad categories of order functions that might be found across different types of order, split 
into security, economic and diplomatic/normative functions.  
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Table 1 – Order functions  
 
 Lack of space precludes a discussion of each order function. However, it is necessary to 
highlight the key functions commonly attributed to great and small power roles to understand the 
implications of ASEAN-great power negotiations in redefining these roles. As great powers have 
superior capabilities they are also assumed to provide security and economic public goods as well 
as providing a general balance of power within international society and exercising local 
preponderance to keep other states in check (Bull 1995: 201-202, 207-212). On top of this, they are 
considered to perform the primary diplomatic/normative function of diplomatic leadership through 
acting as a concert of powers or through institution-building. This is especially at times of crisis and 
  
transition when they are expected to negotiate order and build institutions to lock-in new order 
arrangements (Clark 2001, Goh 2013). The small power role is considered to include 
diplomatic/normative functions in the day-to-day politics of order, not at times of transition. These 
might include conflict mediation, advocacy and rule-making with respect to specific issues but not 
deeper questions of order (Panke 2012). As we will see, the novelty of decoupling diplomatic 
leadership from the great power role and transferring it to the small power role in Southeast Asia, 
has led to ASEAN's unusual prominence in the negotiation and management of post-Cold War Asia-
Pacific order. Before showing how this unfolded it is necessary to outline the role negotiation 
analytical framework. 
 
Role negotiation involves three stages: role conceptualisation, role claiming and role 
enactment. An actor first needs to conceptualise a role (identity, status, function) that they want to 
perform, either by locating a pre-existing role or conceptualising a new role. They then need to 
claim the role. If the actor receives endorsement for their role claims then they can legitimately 
enact the role by performing the functions associated with the role. If others contest the actor's role 
claims then the actor can either give up or re-conceptualise the role and re-claim it. Contestation 
from key constituencies within the audience over all or aspects of the role claim, often accompanied 
by counter-role claims from certain key constituencies, will most likely occur at times when order is 
in transition or unstable. When order appears to be stable it likely means that the role claimant and 
the audience have reached an agreement on what part different actors will play in making and 
managing order. This is when we can look for whether a role bargain has been established. We can 
know when a role bargain has been reached when there exists mutual agreement on: 1) a common 
goal for order; 2) what order functions need to be performed towards achieving that goal; 3) and 
who will perform which order functions. As part of a role bargain a role may be redefined (when a 
claim to a contested function is withdrawn and the function is transferred to actors whose identity or 
status makes them more acceptable performers of the function), an actor may take on a role or a 
new role may be created.  
 
We can operationalise this framework through analysing the practice of legitimation (Reus-
Smit 2007). Actors make claims about their competence to perform particular functions that need 
endorsement from the relevant constituencies of legitimation. Some functions more clearly require 
substantial material capabilities such as those in the security and economic categories. Others do not 
  
such as those in the diplomatic/normative category. For our purposes, ASEAN’s legitimating 
constituencies are the great powers, especially the US and China, the states of Southeast Asia and 
prominent domestic constituencies within ASEAN member states. The great powers are the most 
important constituency because it is only through securing their endorsement that ASEAN has come 
to perform its roles. However, during the Cold War the non-ASEAN Southeast Asian states were 
crucial in limiting ASEAN’s role to the maritime subregion. Domestic constituencies were also 
crucial in shaping ASEAN’s role in its early years and more recently liberal constituencies have put 
pressure on ASEAN to reform meaning ASEAN has had to legitimise its role through appearing 
more ‘people oriented’. However, ASEAN’s ruling classes have been quite successful in fencing 
ASEAN off from serious civil society pressure (Gerard 2014). In seeking to capture the two-way 
process of claims and endorsement, we can understand communication more broadly than merely 
discursive communication. Figure 1 shows a spectrum of claims and endorsement moving from the 







Figure 1 – Spectrum of claims and endorsement 
 
 This spectrum reflects the degree of cost to the actor in making its claim or giving 
endorsement. A purely discursive claim is the least costly as it involves merely rhetoric. A 
substantive claim is the most costly because it involves fully implementing policy action, which 
may require significant mobilisation of resources and/or tackling domestic opposition. Symbolic 
claims and endorsement may move beyond the merely discursive by including gestures and actions 
that indicate the deeper meaning or intention. Performative claims involve policy action that goes 
some way towards performing a function or at least represents an attempt to perform the function, 
whereas performative endorsement would involve acting in a way that corresponds with the actor 
claiming the function. This could include taking part in a claimant's initiatives, following the lead of 
a claimant on an issue, or acquiescing to the claimant's actions by not pursuing alternative policies 
and allowing the actor to go through with a policy.  
 
Discursive Symbolic Performative Substantive 
  
This paper uses an interpretive methodology for determining how legitimation has unfolded and 
when mutually legitimating actors may have reached role bargains. It uses historical and 
contemporary secondary accounts as well as archive documents and oral history interviews to 
establish 1) how ASEAN states and great powers have behaved at any given time and 2) how they 
understood their behaviour in relation to regional order and its goals, the functions that needed to be 
performed and who was considered the rightful performer of those functions. 
 To re-cap, order and social roles are socially negotiated and the key factor for understanding 
what order functions are relevant within a society and which actors will perform them, is 
legitimacy. To establish the legitimacy of a role an actor must conceptualise the role, claim it and 
receive endorsement from the key constituencies of legitimation. The goal of role negotiation is to 
reach a role bargain: a reciprocal arrangement on respective roles. We will now apply this 
framework to the three case studies.  
 
Role negotiation in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific 
 
The US-ASEAN role bargain in Cold War Southeast Asia 1954-1975 
 
Between 1954 and 1965 the US and Indonesia competed to establish different visions of order in 
Southeast Asia, along with competing great power role conceptions. The key contested function was 
‘diplomatic leadership’ and whether this should be performed by the US as it led regional allies in 
containing communism and embedding an anti-communist order or by Indonesia in leading the 
region towards autonomy and freedom from external interference. Throughout there was no mutual 
agreement on what order and its goals should be and therefore no agreement on who should perform 
what functions.  
 
 The US’ vision of an anti-communist order with the goal of containment was formed in the 
early 1950s and its substantive claims to provide security public goods and military leadership 
within non-communist East Asia were revealed in its establishment of the hub-and-spokes alliance 
and base network as well as its military aid and assistance to allies. However, the French defeat at 
Dien Bien Phu in 1954 triggered the US to become more active in promoting this order in Southeast 
Asia as it could no longer leave containment of communism in Indochina to the French (Statler 
2007). The US responded by seeking to galvanise regional states around an expression of collective 
  
defence which began as a call for United Action and eventually led to the creation of the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The US’ efforts revealed an underlying role conception of the 
US as a 'great power guardian'. US officials spoke of the US as 'leader of the free world' and its 
efforts to get regional states behind it demonstrated a performative claim to diplomatic leadership in 
Southeast Asia and to the function of ‘holding the line’ against communist advance in Indochina. 
However, US officials saw Southeast Asian states as weak and vulnerable and did not treat these 
states as equals, meaning the US' claim to diplomatic leadership often merged into a claim to 
‘stewardship’, a function prevalent in Southeast Asia during the colonial era. For example, regional 
states such as Thailand and the Philippines were not invited to initial negotiations over a Southeast 
Asian collective defence treaty in May 1954, causing outrage and accusations of neo-colonialism in 
Bangkok and Manilaii. The US sought to redress this perception at the SEATO conference in 
Bangkok in 1955 by emphasising that it was invited by Asian partners to perform its 'guardian' role 
and that SEATO was a pioneer of the slogan 'Asia for Asians' (Jones 2005). Over time, US officials 
became less concerned about performing diplomatic leadership through SEATO and committed to 
more overt stewardship, intervening within states in order to prevent the spread of communism. The 
US intervened in Indonesia during the outer islands rebellion of 1957-1958 and tried to weaken the 
nationalists and communists and strengthen anti-communist elements within the central government 
(Kahin and Kahin 1997). The US' performance of 'holding the line' in Vietnam also moved from 
deterrence to intervention as it introduced ground troops into South Vietnam to help fight the North 
Vietnamese-backed National Liberation Front in 1965.   
 
 In contrast, Indonesia sought to embed an autonomous order in Southeast Asia, where 
external powers had no role and indigenous states managed their own affairs free from interference. 
Indonesia’s foreign policy reflected its emerging role conception as an 'indigenous great power 
liberator' built on its indigenous identity and its status as 'independent' and ‘non-aligned’, rooted in 
the fact that Indonesia achieved independence through revolution and did not align with either Cold 
War bloc. Indonesia’s role claim was primarily directed at its domestic population as an activist 
anti-colonial foreign policy served to legitimise ruling governments within the highly diverse new 
nation. However, it needed endorsement from other states in order for this to be effective. Indonesia 
saw itself leading other emerging states towards autonomy and freedom by establishing the rules 
appropriate for Southeast Asian order: the Five Principles of Coexistence (Sukma 1995). Indonesia 
made a performative claim diplomatic leadership through organising and hosting the Bandung 
  
Conference in 1955 where President Sukarno pleaded: ‘do not think of colonialism only in the 
classic form … Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual 
control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation’ (MOFA Indonesia 
1955: 19-29). Sukarno argued that newly independent states should seek autonomy through non-
alignment, pursuing relations based on the Five Principles rather than security ties with external 
powers. He pointed to the Colombo Power (India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Pakistan, and Burma) 
meetings in 1954 as an example of non-aligned states bringing a “fresh approach” to the Indochina 
conflict that did not include ultimatums or military mobilisation but rather consultation, diplomacy 
and ideas. Sukarno stated that: ‘[s]ome countries of free Asia … spoke on a subject of immediate 
concern to Asia, and in doing so made it quite clear that the affairs of Asia are the concern of the 
Asian peoples themselves’ (MOFA Indonesia 1955: 19-29).  
 
 After Bandung, with a precarious domestic position balanced between the anti-communist 
military and Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), Sukarno pursued a more radical foreign policy, re-
conceptualising the 'liberator' role from performing diplomatic leadership to revolutionary 
leadership (Leifer 1983). Sukarno enacted the role by taking radical steps to purge any external 
great power presence from the region, seizing foreign assets and pursuing confrontation against 
West Irian (still under Dutch influence) and Malaysia (considered a British plot to maintain its 
influence). Sukarno framed these confrontations as the continuation of Indonesia's revolution and 
tried to enlist support through a new grouping to rival the UN, the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) 
(Jones 2002).  
 
The responses of the relevant constituencies of legitimation in Southeast Asia to the US' role 
claims were mixed but they rejected Indonesia's claims. Thailand, the Philippines and Malaya 
entered into security alliances with Western powers and supported the US' efforts to fight 
communism in Indochina. The Philippines and Thailand sent forces to support the US-led effort and 
Malaysia and Singapore supported US training of South Vietnamese officers at the Jungle Warfare 
School in Johor (Ang 2010). Such allies also promoted the anti-communist cause diplomatically. 
Philippine diplomat Carlos Romulo defended regional states' decisions to take part in collective 
defence with external powers as an act of self-determination and a protection of sovereignty (Jones 
2005). The US' 'great power guardian' role was therefore substantively endorsed by Thailand and 
the Philippines, acquiesced to by states such as Ceylon and Burma, but opposed by India and 
  
Indonesia, not to mention those states where communist social forces were dominant. The US’ 
claim to diplomatic leadership was still problematic as US attempts to lead regional institution-
building were perceived as serving to legitimise US containment imperatives, rather than the 
expressed needs of Asian states. The 'guardian' role therefore only had partial legitimacy. Sukarno's 
claim to diplomatic and then revolutionary leadership alienated other states in maritime Southeast 
Asia which considered Indonesia a significant threat, especially during Confrontation. The PRC and 
North Korea supported Indonesia’s role claims but within Southeast Asia the 'indigenous great 
power liberator' role lacked legitimacy.  
 
  Following the brutal destruction of the PKI and the advent of the Suharto regime in 1966, 
Indonesia re-aligned itself as a partner of the US and non-communist regional states, demonstrating 
a rejection of the 'indigenous great power liberator' role. The US' desire to withdraw from Vietnam 
in the midst of domestic criticism also led to a reconceptualisation of what the US’ role should be. 
The new conception of 'offshore great power guarantor' was reflected in the Nixon Doctrine in 
1969, which established that the US would keep treaty commitments and provide a nuclear shield 
over the region but would no longer commit troops to support regional allies against insurgency 
(Gurtov 1974). The US’ main concern was a face-saving withdrawal from Vietnam, but to the extent 
there was concern about how the region evolved, US officials expected regional states to organise 
themselves. This represented a withdrawal of any claim to diplomatic leadership or stewardship 
leaving space for regional states to play a bigger part in shaping regional order. Negotiations over 
ASEAN’s form during 1966-1975 had important implications for the division of functions in 
Southeast Asia. The ASEAN states eschewed collective security functions but took responsibility 
for promoting 'regional resilience' by establishing that they would not interfere in each other’s 
affairs in a way that undermined members' regime consolidation and economic development (Ba 
2009). ASEAN also became the primary instrument through which members managed their mutual 
relations without interference from external powers. For example, during the Corregidor dispute 
when Philippine-Malaysian relations soured over Philippine claims to Sabah, US officials made a 
point of not getting involved despite calls from Thai and Philippine officials for US interventioniii. 
The dispute was managed to a large extent by Indonesian and Thai mediation through ASEAN and 
the fact that Philippine and Malaysian officials sought to de-escalate the dispute reflected the value 
they saw in ASEAN (Acharya 2014: 48). ASEAN therefore became the 'primary manager' of intra-
regional relations and intra-regional rule-making in non-communist Southeast Asia. ASEAN 
  
endorsed the US' provision of security public goods by accommodating external power military 
bases in the region. It also provided a diplomatic front for legitimising US imperatives in Indochina 
such as at the Jakarta Conference in 1970 when the ASEAN states promoted a US-friendly 
diplomatic solution to the conflict in Cambodia following the Lon Nol coup (Ang 2010).   
 
 By the time of the US’ withdrawal from mainland Southeast Asia in 1975/76 a reciprocal 
role bargain had emerged between the US and ASEAN. The US provided security public goods as 
the 'offshore great power guarantor' in support of non-communist states' regime consolidation. In 
return regional states collectively performed diplomatic leadership as part of ASEAN's 'primary 
manager' role, managing their own relations, not challenging the US' military presence in the region 
and providing diplomatic initiatives to legitimise US aims in Indochina. The goals of communist 
containment and national/regional autonomy were merged to support a common vision of an anti-
communist order in Southeast Asia. ASEAN's diplomatic leadership served to legitimise communist 
containment within maritime Southeast Asia and allowed regional states to demonstrate autonomy. 
By decoupling diplomatic leadership from the great power role and transferring it to regional states, 
ASEAN and the US redefined the great power role in Southeast Asia.   
 
China, ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict: 1978-1991 
 
In late 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia and ousted the abhorrent Khmer Rouge. Until 1989, the 
Vietnamese occupied Cambodia to prop up the puppet People's Republic of Kampuchea. China's 
response to Vietnam's actions was to undertake its own punitive invasion of Vietnam in February 
1979. To oppose Vietnam's occupation, China supported the Khmer Rouge rebels against the 
Vietnamese within Cambodia. Both states aimed to contain the other's influence within Indochina 
and sought to legitimise their mutual containment through claiming competing roles as guarantors 
of Southeast Asia’s security.  
 
Prior to Vietnam’s intervention Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Chinese 
leader Deng Xiaoping both toured ASEAN capitals warning of the dangers the other posed to 
Southeast Asia and asserting their intentions to protect the region against the other. Pham warned 
that China was an external power seeking to dominate the region but assured that Vietnam could act 
as a strong buffer between Southeast Asia and China, thereby seeking to legitimise Vietnam’s 
  
hegemony in Indochina as part of an 'indigenous great power buffer' role claim. Deng countered by 
expressing support for ASEAN and its desire to build a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 
(ZOPFAN) (Lee 1981). He highlighted how Vietnam, contrary to ZOPFAN, had penned an alliance 
with the Soviet Union and warned his hosts not to take lightly Vietnamese warnings to support 
'genuine independence' in the region. He assured that if Vietnam did begin its quest for hegemony 
through invading Cambodia, then China would teach it a lesson. This reflected China efforts to 
legitimise its opposition to Vietnam as part of a 'regional great power guarantor' role claim. China 
would protect ASEAN and guarantee its neutrality through militarily resisting Soviet-Vietnamese 
hegemony (Chang 1979: 254).  
 
In responding to their claims, ASEAN had to take into account: 1) China and Vietnam's 
respective threats to stability and order through expansionism and support for insurgencies; 2) their 
potential contributions to securing ASEAN's preferred vision of order, particularly in relation to 
ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. ASEAN was divided on the first aspect; although all states 
recognised Vietnam's potential threat, they differed with respect to whether China constituted a 
greater threat. On the second aspect however, ASEAN was united. ASEAN collectively endorsed 
China's role claims because China was willing to recognise ASEAN's vision of a coexistence order 
based on non-interference and ASEAN's 'primary manager' role within that order. This was most 
clearly expressed through China’s agreement to stop aiding communist movements within ASEAN 
states (Jones 2012: 89-90). Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia represented its refusal 
to recognise ASEAN's espoused coexistence order and ASEAN's 'primary manager' role.  
 
 China and ASEAN shared the goal of checking Vietnamese hegemony in mainland 
Southeast Asia and reached a reciprocal role bargain through which China took on the 'regional 
great power guarantor' role in non-communist Southeast Asia and ASEAN upheld its 'primary 
manager' role. China contributed to regional order as ASEAN understood it through expressing 
support for non-interference, withdrawing aid to communist opposition groups and by performing 
the function of 'holding the line' against Soviet-Vietnamese expansionism through its security 
guarantee to Thailand and backing of the Cambodian resistance. This division of labour was further 
backed up by the US remaining as the ‘offshore great power guarantor’ keeping a distance but 
supporting the coalition through normalising relations with China, acquiescing to its invasion of 
Vietnam, selling arms to China and providing diplomatic support for ASEAN. ASEAN gained 
  
further endorsement for its 'primary manager' role from China and other external partners and was 
able to use it to assert the salience of its rules and processes over Cambodia in the face of great 
power involvement. ASEAN led the international campaign against Vietnam's actions within the 
UN and the Non-aligned Movement ensuring the conflict was defined as an illegal intervention and 
establishing that Cambodia should be returned to neutral and independent status after Vietnam's 
withdrawal (Ang 2013). ASEAN needed China to bolster the Cambodian rebels' military opposition 
so that it remained credible as a fighting force and China needed ASEAN to provide a Southeast 
Asian diplomatic voice on the global stage to maintain broad-based opposition towards Vietnam.   
 
 However, Malaysia and Indonesia still considered China the principal threat and tried to 
reach out to Vietnam during the conflict, notably through the Kuantan Principle of 1980. This 
declared that Vietnam should maintain neutrality between the Soviet Union and China and that there 
should be a political resolution of the Cambodian conflict which recognised Vietnam's security 
interests in Cambodia (Van der Kroef 1981). They resisted China's role-taking in Southeast Asia by 
trying to undermine the China-ASEAN bargain and hold out the possibility of an alternative bargain 
with Vietnam: ASEAN would recognise Vietnam's interests in Indochina if Vietnam recognised 
ASEAN's 'primary manager' role by acknowledging that ASEAN's rule-making applied to 
Indochina. Withdrawing from Cambodia would recognise ASEAN's norm of non-interference and 
ending its links with the Soviet Union would recognise regional autonomy. However, Vietnam 
insisted that the situation in Cambodia was irreversible.  
 
 The ASEAN states therefore sought to put limits on China's influence in Southeast Asia. 
ASEAN asserted the salience of its norms and processes over the whole of Southeast Asia to ensure 
that China's contribution to order was limited to 'holding the line', a function specific to the 
Cambodian conflict. ASEAN pursued this through trying to limit the influence of the China-backed 
Khmer Rouge in a post-occupation Cambodia. ASEAN initially called for the disarming of the 
Cambodian rebels (which would disproportionately impact the KR) at the International Conference 
on Kampuchea in 1981. This was opposed by China so ASEAN sponsored the creation of the 
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea to dilute the influence of the KR. Certain ASEAN 
states also sought to draw the US into funding the non-communist rebel factions with limited 
success (Jones 2012). ASEAN was, however, able to commit China to supporting a neutral 
Cambodia. In 1981 Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang assured ASEAN that China supported an 
  
independent, neutral and non-aligned Cambodia and had no intention of imposing a communist 
regime or making Cambodia a Chinese satellite (Chang 1985: 123). By securing this commitment, 
ASEAN aimed to play the predominant part in order negotiation and management in the whole of 
Southeast Asia after the Cambodian conflict was resolved. It could not fully realise this during the 
Cambodian conflict as the communist states in mainland Southeast Asia contested ASEAN’s role. 
However, in the 1990s ASEAN achieved this aim as all the mainland states sought ASEAN 
membership.    
 
ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role: 1991-present  
 
In the immediate post-Cold War years, ASEAN faced irrelevance as the Cold War logic 
underpinning the previous role bargains fell apart. The ASEAN states took steps to sure up the US’ 
commitment to security public goods by individually agreeing access arrangements (Ba 2009: 165-
169) and engaged China to socialise it into considering itself a 'responsible regional great power' 
rather than seeking to revise regional order (Wanandi 1996). To ensure its continued relevance 
ASEAN needed to create a new role. 
 
ASEAN’s response to various proposals for regional security dialogue emanating from the 
Soviet Union, Canada and Australia revealed its emerging ‘regional conductor’ role conception 
(Dewitt 1994). ASEAN saw these as a threat due to the fact that ASEAN may either be subsumed 
within them or marginalised (Ba 2009). ASEAN instead posited its Post-ministerial Conference 
(PMC) as the appropriate venue for convening the dialogue. The arguments made to justify this 
reflected  ASEAN’s role conception, which included the identity elements of ASEAN as an 
indigenous and united actor; status elements of ASEAN neutrality and competence as a successful 
manager of Southeast Asian order; and the primary function of diplomatic leadership with 
secondary functions of inclusive engagement and rule-making. 
 
 ASEAN emphasised its indigenous identity through rejecting ‘external’ proposals for 
security dialogue as inappropriate for Asian culture and instead promoting its own model. It 
highlighted its neutrality and status as a successful manager through the design of the proposed 
dialogue based on the 'ASEAN way': informal dialogue, moving at a pace comfortable to all, with 
all decisions based on consensus (Acharya 2014: 171-173). This ensured the process could not be 
  
dominated by any single power, showing that ASEAN was acting as a neutral facilitator of inclusive 
security dialogue (Almonte 1997/98). ASEAN's promotion of its model and use of the PMC to 
launch regional security dialogue showed it was also making a statement about its success in 
managing Southeast Asian order. Singaporean Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng stated that 
ASEAN's model ‘builds confidence … while minimizing conflict. It is this approach, of broadly 
engaging our neighbours in Southeast Asia and others in the larger Asia-Pacific that will help 
promote and strengthen conditions for regional peace and stability’ (Chua and Kwang 1992). 
ASEAN made symbolic claims regarding its united identity and competence to extend its 
diplomatic leadership at the Singapore Summit 1992 by agreeing to create an ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) and by upgrading the stature of the Secretariat and the office of Secretary-General. 
ASEAN also institutionalised summit meetings, agreeing to hold them every three years rather than 
on an ad hoc basis (Antolik 1992). ASEAN made a performative claim the function of 'inclusive 
engagement' by inviting all major powers and players to attend the ARF. The ASEAN Senior 
Officials Meeting 1993 outlined the rationale of 'inclusive engagement', stating that:  
 
[t]he continuing presence of the United States, as well as stable relationships among the 
United States, Japan and China, and other states of the region would contribute to regional 
stability … ASEAN and its dialogue partners … [should] … work with other regional states 
to evolve a predictable and constructive pattern of relationships in the Asia-Pacific (Emmers 
2003: 115).  
 
 All the key powers performatively endorsed ASEAN's claims by agreeing to participate in 
the ARF. US State Department officials saw US participation in the ARF under ASEAN's leadership 
as necessary to demonstrate the US' engagement on the region's terms, forestalling attempts to 
develop an exclusive Asian grouping. ASEAN was also highly regarded in the State Department at 
that time due to its economic success and its diplomatic contribution (Brown 2003). Japan was the 
most enthusiastic endorser, supporting Singapore in reaching a consensus within ASEAN on 
security dialogue and helping to bring the US around (Satoh 1995). China was initially sceptical 
about multilateralism, seeing it as another means of containment in the wake of the Tiananmen 
Square killings. However, ASEAN's assurances that the dialogue would be informal with consensus 
decision-making reassured the Chinese that they would not be singled out within the process.  
 
  
 ASEAN enacted its 'regional conductor' role by convening the first full regional 'orchestra' at 
the ARF. Through the function of ‘inclusive engagement’, ASEAN provided a new basis for its 
relevance in the post-Cold War context. ASEAN’s ‘score’ was also accepted by the regional 
'orchestra'; the ARF Concept Paper described the TAC ‘as a code of conduct governing relations 
between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive 
diplomacy, and political and security cooperation’ (ASEAN 1995). ASEAN therefore contributed to 
emerging regional order by ensuring that it would be norm-governed, based on ASEAN norms 
provided in the TAC. 
 
 ASEAN situated its 'regional conductor' role within reciprocal role bargains with the US vis-
à-vis its ‘offshore great power guarantor’ role and China vis-à-vis its emerging ‘responsible regional 
great power’ role. ASEAN did not challenge the US' bilateral alliances through its proposed security 
dialogue, nor 'draw a line down the Pacific' by developing an exclusive East Asian regional 
grouping; rather, by inviting the US to join the ARF, ASEAN helped the Clinton administration sell 
its Asia-focused foreign policy domestically in a way that did not alienate regional states through 
appearing as an 'international nanny' (Goh 2004). ASEAN was also able to demonstrate regional 
autonomy in shaping the emerging regional order in a way that maintained its relevance. In return 
for China recognising ASEAN as the 'regional conductor' and showing restraint through accepting 
regional norms, ASEAN recognised China's concerns by emphasising the informality of the ARF, 
not inviting Taiwan to join and keeping the Taiwan issue off the ARF agenda. Aside from the 
Mischief Reef incident and the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1995-1996, China appeared to recognise the 
need to demonstrate restraint, publishing a Defence White Paper and acquiescing to the South 
China Sea conflict being discussed at the ARF meeting in 1995. ASEAN’s ability to persuade China 
to discuss the issue at the ARF showed the benefit of ASEAN's 'inclusive engagement'. A US State 
Department official reported that:  
 
‘[t]he ARF … could put a certain amount of pressure on the Chinese and force the Chinese 
to take opinions in the region into account in ways that the Chinese wouldn't have had to do 
if the organization didn't exist ... One year after its creation, the ARF was serving as a 
significant forum for discussion’ (Brown 2003). 
 
 These initial role bargains were challenged in the late 1990s when western constituencies 
  
began contesting ASEAN’s status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order in the wake of 
the Asian Financial Crisis and when US attention turned towards the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) in 2001. ASEAN managed to avoid the deterioration of its role by convening an exclusive 
'East Asian' regional 'orchestra' as a hedge against the perceived excesses of US unilateralism. 
Japanese and Chinese willingness to support ASEAN after the financial crisis, meant ASEAN was 
able to establish summit-level ASEAN Plus One and ASEAN Plus Three (APT) frameworks with 
the two states and South Korea giving institutional form to an 'East Asian' region that did not 
include the US. ASEAN nested the APT within the ASEAN process meaning it was able to maintain 
control over how East Asian regionalism developed (Dent 2010: 8). ASEAN used the Plus One and 
APT processes to channel emerging Sino-Japanese competition into two order-building processes: 
negotiating regional order functions as the two states competed to contribute to the Chiang Mai 
Initiative and promote regional trade agreements; and providing a 'vision' for a regional 'East Asian 
community' (Goh 2013: 61-68). The eventual outcome of negotiations over regional order functions 
and a vision for East Asian community was the ASEAN-led East Asia Summit established in 2005. 
ASEAN strengthened its ‘regional conductor’ role by asserting that the EAS be convened in 
ASEAN states and that membership was dependent on making a formal commitment to ASEAN’s 
‘score’ by signing the TAC. Since then, ASEAN has seen off challenges in the form of alternative 
‘architecture’ proposals (e.g. former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s Asia-Pacific 
Community proposal) and expanded the number of forums within which it performs the 'regional 
conductor' role, including the expanded EAS (with Russian and US membership) and the ASEAN 
Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus. There is now a general understanding amongst the western states 
that the EAS is the premier political and security forum and should be supported and developed 
rather than new institutions being proposed (Fuchs 2015).  
 
The major challenge for ASEAN in maintaining its role is in upholding role bargains that are 
acceptable to the great powers. The ASEAN-US bargain has been re-invigorated after the 
challenges of the Bush administration. The US has endorsed ASEAN’s role through signing the 
TAC, establishing the ASEAN-US summit, establishing a permanent US ambassador to ASEAN 
and upgrading the US-ASEAN relationship to a 'strategic partnership'. It has also renewed its 
commitment to provide security public goods as part of the ‘rebalance’. However, the US now 
expects ASEAN to use its diplomatic leadership to leigitimise US interests and preponderance in the 
South China Sea. US officials’ expect ASEAN to promote a ‘rules-based order’, with an emphasis 
  
on upholding freedom of navigation and overflight and obstructing China’s efforts to consolidate its 
control over the SCS (Hachigian 2015). The problem with this is that it exacerbates existing issues 
between ASEAN and China. There is a question regarding China’s commitment to the ‘responsible 
regional great power’ role as it was defined in the 1990s-2000s during China’s ‘good neighbour’ 
strategy. China seems to have dropped its commitment towards ‘restraint’ and now seeks to redefine 
what its rights and responsibilities are in the region (Deng 2015). Evidence of this can be seen in the 
China-led One Belt, One Road initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Lancang-
Mekong Cooperation (LMC) mechanism as well as China’s ‘assertiveness’ in the SCS. This has 
tested ASEAN's ability to maintain an acceptable role bargain with China, especially as China has 
sought to scupper any efforts at ASEAN developing a consensus on the SCS and instead re-focus 
ASEAN’s attention to the broader ASEAN-China relationship whilst promoting bilateral 
negotiations with claimants over the SCS. This is not acceptable for the original ASEAN-5 and 
Vietnam which are uncomfortable with the prospect of Chinese hegemony, although the Philippines 
has softened its approach since the election of President Duterte. ASEAN therefore appears stuck: it 
cannot wield its authority as a ‘regional conductor’ in the SCS because of Chinese contestation and 
lack of consensus but it needs to act in order to meet the US’ expectations. This means its ‘regional 
conductor’ role is in a precarious balance between consolidation and deterioration as the 




This paper has argued that ASEAN's prominence in regional order negotiation and management in 
Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific is based on ASEAN performing legitimate social roles as the 
‘primary manager’ and 'regional conductor'. It presented a framework for analysing role negotiation 
and showed how this framework can be applied to negotiations between ASEAN and the great 
powers from the early Cold War years to the present day. Through this we can better understand 
how ASEAN's prominence is part of a regional division of labour developed through cumulative 
social role negotiation. The question of the future of ASEAN’s role depends on ASEAN being able 
to manage the competing pressures of great power rivalry and continue renegotiating role bargains 
with the great powers. This is made uncertain by: what the expectations of the great powers are with 
respect to their own roles and ASEAN’s role particularly vis-à-vis the SCS conflict; and whether 
ASEAN can reach a consensus on the SCS issue and maintain some sort of unity in demonstrating 
  
its continued competence to perform inclusive engagement and rule-making. It remains to be seen 
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i  This conception of ASEAN’s role is based on a metaphor of the Asia-Pacific as an 'orchestra' where the great 
powers make up the different sections (brass, woodwind, percussion, strings). They possess the instruments 
(military hardware, economic and financial resources); it is they that essentially 'make the music'. The problem of 
great power rivalry means that the different sections want the orchestra to play their own 'score' (vision of regional 
order) and thus exist in a state of competition. Instead, the 'conductor', who does not possess any instrument (lacks 
material capabilities), steps up to provide a 'score' (framework of norms and rules) for the orchestra to play. It is 
able to do so because it is acknowledged as neutral and competent. 
ii “Memorandum of conversation by the ofﬁcer in charge of Thai and Malayan Affairs, 27th May 1954” Foreign 
Relations of the US 1952-1954 Vol XII Part 1 Doc 208 and “Telegram: The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the 
United Kingdom, Washington, 4th June 1954”  ibid Doc 215.   
iii “Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary 
of State Rusk, Washington, 20th May /1968” FRUS 1964-1968 Vol XXVI Doc 367 and “Telegram From the 
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